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Abstract  
 
After a long period of centralization, local authorities have been taking a new place in the French 
energy sector. This revival began in the 1990‟s, with the process of liberalization, which gave them new 
rooms to manoeuvre. They recovered old competences that had fallen into abeyance after the creation of 
national public monopolies and gained new ones. A new turning point has been passed over the last few 
years with the agenda-setting of energy efficiency and climate change issues. This was linked to a new 
strategy of the State and the idea that these problems require to “act (more) local”, such a level being 
considered to be efficient in terms of proximity, reactivity or coordination capabilities. For the first time, 
local authorities were explicitly recognized as active protagonists of the energy policy in France (law POPE 
of July 2005, „Grenelle de l‟environnement‟). Some practitioners and academic researchers consider this 
stage as a major institutional innovation which initiates a new model of governance. 
 
In this contribution, we propose to discuss this hypothesis and to show that this change of paradigm in 
energy policy making (the energy efficiency and climate-change watershed) had not yet lead to major 
evolutions in the central-local relations. If one cannot deny that local authorities have been developing new 
institutional capacities for the last decade, their role is still quite limited. Their revival must therefore be 
interpreted as an aggiornamento of the former centralized model of governance. Three explanations will be 
mobilized to illustrate this thesis. 
 
The first one is due to the contradictions inside State apparatus about the place to give to local 
authorities. Nowadays, two main public policies impact the French energy sector: the liberalization process 
on the one hand, energy efficiency and climate change issues on the second hand. In these two policies, the 
“local level” has not the same status. For the former (competition), local authorities are considered as a 
threat to market running. Consequently, the stake is to reduce their capacity to act. For the latter (energy 
efficiency and climate change), local authorities are considered as useful levers to strengthen State action 
and make it more efficient. The implicit hierarchy existing between these two policies, in favor of the 
competition policy, is a first factor that explains the persistence of a centralized model. 
 
The second explanation has to do with the system of actors that are involved locally in energy issues. 
Due to the existence of many levels in the French political system, due to the way the energy sector was 
build in the last century, numerous actors coexist locally, each one having its own competences and 
resources: „communes‟, „intercommunalités‟, „syndicats départementaux d‟énergie‟, „départements‟, 
regions. This fragmentation reduces the capacity of local authorities - among others the cities, which are 
especially concerned by environmental issues - to implement public policies in energy. 
 
A third and last explanation needs to enter the “black box” of local authorities and to put attention to 
staff expertise (lack of human resources to deal with a complex matter) and to political involvement (the 
way local politicians consider energy issues). This is of great importance too, to avoid overestimating the 
place energy issues occupy in the agenda of local authorities. 
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Over the last two decades, numerous factors have contributed to dramatic changes in energy 
regulation, leading to what many researchers call a period of “energy transition” (Jorgensen, 2005; 
Monstadt, 2007; Verbong, Geels, 2007; Kern, Smith, 2008; Loorbach, Kemp, 2008; Rohracher 2008). 
Environmental issues have been playing an increasingly important role, with the perspective of a near 
depletion of energy resources –especially fossil fuels- and climate change agenda-setting. This has lead to 
a rethink of many aspects of energy policy - technical, economic, social and political. In particular, these 
issues have forced both politicians and experts to renew the process of policy-making at many different 
levels: international, national and local. 
  In this context, local authorities have been gaining a new role in energy regulation3 in Europe. This is 
particularly the case in France, where the centralizing tradition was quite strong in the past, unlike in 
other European countries such as Germany, Denmark, Norway or Sweden, which have traditionally been 
organized on a more local level. In 2007, the report of the ‘Grenelle de l’environnement’, a participative 
process launched by the French government to develop an ambitious national sustainable development 
policy, referred to local authorities as major actors in the struggle against climate change (Grenelle de 
l’environnement, 2007). This attention to the local level reflects a dramatic change in the way local 
authorities are taken into account in policy making in comparison with the past, when State officials or 
operators considered that they might jeopardize the general interest. Now, according to many 
researchers or practitioners (Droege, 2009; REN21 et alii, 2009), the increasing focus on environmental 
issues needs to allow for more input from local authorities given their advantages in terms of proximity 
(to consumers), knowledge of territory (for developing renewable energy) or their capacity to coordinate 
many different fields (urbanism, transportation, public housing, etc.). Some experts are calling for 
increased decentralization in order to develop a more “horizontal” and integrated approach which can 
contribute to greater efficiency when compared to traditional “vertical” and sector-based policies. 
In this contribution4, we propose to discuss whether or not this recent “activism” at local level 
associated with a change of paradigm in energy policy making (the environmental watershed) is leading to 
a new pattern of territorial governance in France. After a brief overview of the period before the 1990s (I) 
in order to understand the current situation, we will describe how local authorities have been gaining new 
competencies over the last two decades leading to a more complex pattern of interactions between 
central and local levels (II). We will then show that such “activism” - partially linked to the environmental 
focus - has not yet led to major changes in central-local relations and that four main forces have 
succeeded in maintaining centralization: State officials, national operators, rural politicians and nuclear 
industrialists. Although one cannot deny that local authorities have been developing new institutional 
capacities over the last decade, their role remains relatively limited. Their revival must therefore be 
interpreted in terms of institutional continuity or an “aggiornamento” of the former pattern of 
governance. 
 
1. Central-local relations in French energy policy before the 1990s 
 
It is common to rank France among the most centralized countries from an energy regulation 
perspective. This is due to a longstanding jacobin tradition in public policy which is not specific to energy 
but has always been strong in such a strategic sector. Handling new issues such as energy independence, 
rural development, economic and social progress, government action intensified after the First World War 
leading to a more centralized system. This resulted in the creation of two public monopolies in 1946 in 
charge of energy supply - Electricité de France (EDF) and Gaz de France (GDF). Placed under State 
supervision, they were powerful tools in defining national energy policy in terms of social redistribution, 
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 In this paper, we will focus on energy issues in buildings (lighting, heating, domestic appliances...) but not in 
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4
 Our analysis is based on different research conducted in the field of energy since 1995 and, more recently, on a 
workshop we organized in 2008-2009 with Marie d‟Arcimoles (LATTS) for the MEEDDM, the French Ministry 
in charge of energy issues inter alia. The aim of the workshop was to identify ways in which this ministry could 
mobilize local authorities in order to promote more sustainable energy policies, especially in the fight against 
climate change and fuel poverty. Seven meetings were organized, bringing together both sector professionals and 
researchers. 
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territorial planning or economic competition (Picard, Beltran et Bungener, 1985 ; Beltran, Williot, 1992; 
Levy-Leboyer, Morsel, 1994). 
However, this centralization process was not complete (Poupeau, 2004). Local authorities continued 
to exercise a certain amount of control which moderated the State’s hegemony. To understand this 
process and the very nature of French central-local relations before the 1990s, it is important to bear in 
mind that, as in many other countries (Hughes, 1983), the first energy networks were developed locally. 
This was the case, in France with gas (from the 1830s), electricity (from the 1880s) and heating (from the 
1920s) networks built without the support of central government which did not consider energy to be a 
public utility. In such a context, energy networks were placed under local authority supervision. Using 
concession arrangements, cities signed commercial contracts with operators to develop infrastructures. In 
return for a long-term territorial monopoly (up to 30 years), operators negotiated rates and investment 
with local authorities. The law of 15th July 1906 confirmed this situation by making concession 
arrangements compulsory for all electricity and gas operators, thus providing local powers with a central 
role in the French energy regulation system. 
Consequently, when centralizing forces supported State intervention, they had to deal with local 
lobbies. The concession regime was never challenged under the political systems of the IIIrd and IVth 
Republics. Heating plants were not placed under State supervision when the nationalization laws were 
adopted (1946). This was a first counterweight to centralization, albeit a relatively minor one insofar as 
such networks were quite rare in comparison with other countries. The concession arrangement was also 
upheld for electricity and gas supply, even after nationalization. To gain support from politicians to ensure 
that a law would be adopted, lawmakers agreed to preserve local prerogatives. The rural electrification 
fund created in 1936 (known in French as Facé - Fonds d’amortissement des charges d’électrification) was 
maintained, leaving rural politicians with a powerful tool to influence decisions concerning distribution 
network investment5. The concession regime adopted in 1906 was not abolished and although it became 
a legal fiction –politicians could not choose any operators other than EDF and GDF, which enjoyed a 
monopoly over distribution - local authorities were entitled to have a say in pricing or investment issues. 
These compromises resulted in a form of centralization that was considerably attenuated by local 
actors. This pattern was characterized by the institutional weight of representatives from rural areas at 
both national and local level, and, in close correlation, the gradual erosion of the power of cities. To 
understand this situation, it is important to stress that rural politicians have always been allies of central 
government in its attempt to control energy. As a matter of fact, many of them considered the situation in 
the 1930s as unfavorable to their interests. Facing powerful and increasingly concentrated private 
operators, rural communes found that they were unable to negotiate with their partners on an equal 
footing. This resulted in higher prices for rural consumers as cities had far greater bargaining power. In 
such a situation, rural politicians did not consider the State as an opponent but rather as an ally whose 
intervention could counteract the local “asymmetry” of powers. In 1933, they decided to create a national 
lobby, the FNCCR (Fédération nationale des collectivités concédantes et régies – national federation of 
concession grantors and locally-controlled concession operators) to force central government to regulate 
prices and to require private operators to invest more heavily in network development. From the 1930s, 
the FNCCR became a partner of central government and even called for partial nationalization of the 
energy sector. It provided solid support in 1946 when nationalization was discussed in Parliament. 
In return for this support, rural representatives were granted a central role in energy regulation. At 
national level, the FNCCR emerged as the sole representative of local interests vis-à-vis central 
government and public monopolies (EDF and Gaz de France). This privileged position allowed rural 
politicians - the majority of FNCCR members- to negotiate structuring measures, one of the most 
important of these being the harmonization of domestic electricity rates for rural and urban customers in 
the 1960s (Poupeau, 2007). This initiative, which had been unsuccessful before the creation of EDF, was 
made possible thanks to the FNCCR’s action and despite the opposition of EDF officials and city councils. 
At a local level, the preservation of the Facé fund despite nationalization, gave rural politicians many 
different ways of influencing local investment. They decided to form bodies (syndicats départementaux 
d’énergie) which strengthened their position locally. Cities now had less room for maneuver than in the 
past. The few of them that did have heating network operators – which had not been nationalized – had 
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to deal with the aggressive commercial strategies of the two national public monopolies (Lenoir, 2007). 
This was the case with EDF up to the 1970s when the ambitious French nuclear program required it to sell 
more electricity, leading the public company into a struggle with local heating networks. This was also the 
case for GDF up to the 1980s when it tried to develop gas networks in cities to compete with EDF and 
prepare for market deregulation. In such a context, the power of cities decreased when compared with 
the period before nationalization. 
This particular institutional trajectory resulted in a powerful coalition between four main forces: 
central government (ministries of finance and industry), national public operators (EDF and GDF), rural 
politicians (FNCCR) and the nuclear industry (CEA and Framatome 6 ). Thanks to the institutional 
centralization described above, the latter was allocated generous resources to implement the nuclear 
program: capacity to finance major investments, close relations with State officials and short decision-
making channels, and political support for certain technological and economic choices… This in turn 
strengthened the centralization process and explained its stability throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
2. 1980 to 2000: new opportunities for local authorities 
 
This pattern of central-local relations began to be challenged from the mid-1970s with, in particular, 
the return of local authorities to energy regulation. New opportunities appeared within the scope of a 
more general evolution of public action and State intervention in this field: from direct intervention to 
regulation and from infrastructure and modernization to a more service and market oriented approach. 
This “revival” was far from being “mechanical” as it was the result of an institutional “struggle” led by 
new actors fighting for a more decentralized system. Many of these were close to green or socialist 
politicians who had been elected to the regions, a new institutional level of government created in the 
early 1970s and which was heavily involved in managing the ongoing energy crisis. Three key local 
representatives’ associations entered the energy sector in the 1980s and tried to challenge the former 
centralized pattern of territorial governance: AMORCE7 (heating networks), AIVF8 (engineers responsible 
for energy issues in local authorities) and CLER9 (renewable energy). They advocated giving more power 
to local authorities, especially cities and regions, the old system being dominated by central government 
and the départements (rural political level). This lobbying involved four main phases from the 1980s up to 
the 2000s: 
 
 
                                                          
6
 The Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (CEA – French Atomic Energy Agency) was created in 1945 to 
conduct civil and military nuclear research. This led to the creation (in the late 1950s) of Framatome, a Franco-
American consortium which played a central role in the French civil nuclear program. 
7
 AMORCE (national association bringing together local authorities, associations and enterprises involved in 
managing waste, energy and heating networks) was created in 1987 to defend the interests of heating networks, 
particularly against the aggressive commercial strategies of EDF and GDF. This association currently counts 510 
members (3/4 local politicians and ¼ heating companies). Its action is broader than that of the heating networks 
and AMORCE deals with more general energy and waste issues. 
8
 AIVF (association of French municipal engineers) which later changed its name to AITF (association of French 
territorial engineers). In this association, a network of energy engineers created an “energy group” in the 1980s 
in order to pool experience and to make proposals to improve energy management in local authorities. 
9
 CLER (renewable energy liaison committee) was created in 1984 and is close to green politicians and 
opponents of nuclear energy. 
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Fig. 1. The “revival” of local authorities in energy 
 
The first of these was the decentralization process initiated at the beginning of the 1980s10. Even 
though energy issues were not specifically mentioned11, this process gave more autonomy and wider 
powers to local authorities in the fields of urban planning and urbanism which have a significant bearing 
on energy issues. For many different reasons (to make savings, preserve the environment, combat fuel 
poverty, etc.) a number of local authorities began to develop energy-related initiatives. 
The liberalization process which overhauled the energy market12 marked a second, much more 
important stage because of its direct consequences on energy regulation (Poupeau, 2004). Local 
authorities, just like any other customer were now free to choose their own supplier (July 2004). In the 
distribution sector, EDF and GDF were forced to negotiate concession-based contracts for the first time 
since 1946, giving more opportunities for local authorities to influence decisions regarding network 
investments. In the production sector, local authorities were given the right to invest in decentralized 
production units provided such investments were compatible with the multi-annual national plan defined 
by the State (PPI - Programmation pluri-annuelle des investissements d’électricité). 
Along with the energy crisis and climate change agenda setting, two other developments completed 
this “revival”. The POPE Law13, which integrated the French “factor 414” strategy for the first time and 
whose role was to define the main objectives of French energy policy over the next few decades, 
strengthened local powers in terms of production. In order to boost renewable energy – which should 
represent at least 21% of electricity consumed by 2010 -, local authorities were encouraged to support 
decentralized production. In order to save energy, cities were given explicit demand-side management 
powers to reduce energy consumption on their territory, especially in the residential sector, which is 
responsible for a large portion of CO2 emissions. 
The final stage – at this moment in time – in this local revival process was the Grenelle de 
l’environnement, which began in 2007 after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as President of the French 
Republic. It initiated a major debate about environmental issues (climate change, biodiversity, health) in 
order to integrate these challenges into public policies, especially energy policy. Between 2007 and 2009, 
many groups, including the State, the private sector, NGOs, trade unionists and politicians tried to define 
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 Laws of 2
nd
 March 1982, and 7
th
 January and 22
th
 July 1983. 
11
 Despite many debates about the reorganization of energy competencies between central and local government, 
no significant changes resulted from this process. A key reason was the fear that energy decentralization could 
weaken EDF and the development of the French nuclear program (Bourjol, Le Lamer, 1983; Poupeau, 1999). 
12
 Mainly the laws of 10
th
 February 2000, 3
rd
 January 2003 and 9
th
 August 2004. 
13
 The POPE law setting out broad French energy policy guidelines was adopted on 13
th
 July 2005. 
14
 Based on the analysis of the Club of Rome in the 1990s (but with a different signification in the French case), 
the “Factor 4” strategy was first mentioned in 2003 by the French Government. It consists in dividing national 
CO2 emissions by 4 between now and 2050. 
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ambitious goals to “green” public action. This gave rise to two main laws adopted in 2008 and 2009-
201015. Many proposals favored local authorities as an appropriate administrative level for dealing with 
environmental issues. Cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants had to define energy and climate plans in 
order to participate in the reduction of CO2 emissions. More opportunities were given to local authorities 
to create / extend heating plants and connect these to renewable sources of energy. 
These numerous changes have resulted in more complex central-local relations where local 
authorities can draw on five main resources or functions to intervene in energy-related issues: (i) as 
consumers, they can invest in their own buildings (insulation, efficient heating systems, etc.), influence the 
behavior of people using these municipal buildings (in schools, libraries, sport centers, etc.) or purchase 
“green energy” in order to reduce CO2 emissions; (ii) as initiators, they can use “soft” tools to try to 
involve their whole territory in more efficient consumption behavior. Some have created local energy 
agencies (Poupeau, 2008) while others subsidize ‘espaces infos énergie’ (EIE) inspired by British energy 
centers to make citizens more aware of energy issues by giving them advice; (iii) as urban planners, they 
can encourage the renovation of old buildings or try to convince developers to invest in more energy-
efficient buildings even though construction guidelines are a central government prerogative16; (iv) as 
concession grantor, they can influence operators’ local investment strategy (electricity, gas, heating 
networks) and sometimes their pricing strategy (heating networks) to promote energy efficiency on their 
territory; (v) finally, as direct or indirect producers they can combat climate change by promoting 
renewable energy and, for those who run heating companies, use these to improve energy efficiency 
locally. 
The concept of governance seems appropriate for describing the outputs of this revival, which has 
led to more complex interactions between local authorities, central government, operators, consumers 
and representatives of civil society. However, we would like to go further and attempt to show how this 
“Brownian movement” is in fact highly structured around a new central/local government hierarchy. Two 
issues need to be considered. First, have recent changes led to a new balance of power between central 
and local government? Secondly, have they modified the relationships between local authorities 
themselves? Can we observe, for example, an increase in the power of cities and a weakening in the 
power of rural areas? To assess these two questions, we propose to focus on the last three functions 
mentioned above - namely local authorities as urban planners, concession grantors and producers - 
because they may affect the core activities of the energy market on both the supply and demand sides 
and be used to promote an alternative, more decentralized pattern of energy regulation. Extending the 
scope of local authorities’ powers as urban planners or concession grantors may have many consequences 
on how energy markets are run. For example, cities may attempt to intervene as “local regulators” by 
planning the development of electricity, gas and heating networks. As producers, local authorities may 
require domestic or industrial customers living in their territory to take more advantage of the energy 
they produce by setting lower prices or by selling energy directly to them. These issues make it necessary 
to focus on the way these last three functions are used by local authorities, thus revealing the very nature 
of the ongoing pattern of territorial governance. 
 
3. Centralizing forces and the “revival” of local authorities: a strategy of containment 
 
After the nationalization law of 1946 and the creation of two public monopolies (EDF and GDF), the 
functions of concession grantor and producer continued to be hot issues for French energy policymakers 
who feared that they could jeopardize the centralization process. Only political arguments justified 
maintaining these two local powers in 1946 in order to gain local politicians’ support for the creation of 
EDF and GDF. After that, concession contracts were no longer signed and fell into abeyance. EDF and the 
State were afraid that local authorities would use them as a means to interfere in energy regulation. For 
the same reasons, local urban planning functions did not include any input into energy policy making as 
the two national public operators preferred to control their own investments and markets. 
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 The “Grenelle 1” Law passed on October 21st 2008 and “Grenelle 2”, passed by the French Senate on October 
8
th
 2009, pending examination by the French parliament in 2010. 
16
 However, the Grenelle laws make it possible for local authorities to introduce energy performance criteria for 
new buildings, which is an innovation in this field. 
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However, claims for a more decentralized pattern of governance constantly arose supported by the 
new forces we talked about in the previous section. This was the case in the beginning of 1980’s, 
following the election of François Mitterrand as president of the French Republic. People belonging to the 
socialist government advocated cutting back the powers of EDF and GDF in regional entities and providing 
local authorities – regions and cities– with wider powers in territorial energy policy making. They wanted 
urban planning, concession grantors and production functions to be used as tools to limit oil dependency 
and develop a more efficient energy system. But this attempt failed (Bourjol, Le Lamer, 1984). In the 
1990s, when EDF and GDF decided to negotiate concession contracts, associations such as AMORCE, CLER 
or AIVF called in vain for more power to be given to the cities. These actors recently returned to the 
institutional arena during the Grenelle de l’environnement where they contended that the fight against 
climate change justifies a new institutional departure and a new, more decentralized basis of territorial 
governance. They advocated strengthening the hand of cities, by giving them the possibility to create local 
energy operators and to develop a wider range of competencies - including energy, transportation and 
urbanism - in order to pursue ambitious public policies. 
These attempts did not lead to dramatic changes in central-local relations. Three main explanations 
can be advanced to explain this failure and the persistence of a quite centralized structure that gives 
relatively little power to local authorities: the production structure, the emergence of a neo-liberal 
paradigm and the action of rural politicians. This stresses the capacity of the afore-mentioned coalition 
made up, as we said, of State officials, national public operators, rural politicians and nuclear industrialists 
to resist change and maintain a quite “vertical” and sector-based pattern of regulation. 
 
3.1. The production structure 
 
In France, the question of energy decentralization has always been closely linked to the nature of 
industrial structure, especially the production-distribution system. When the first energy networks were 
developed (19th-20th centuries), private operators were organized on a local basis. The impossibility at this 
time of building long-distance transportation infrastructures forced them to produce and distribute their 
energy locally. This led to close (and sometimes conflicting) relationships with local authorities and the 
possibility for the latter of coordinating energy policy or trying to operate their own territorial resources 
for the benefit of citizens and firms alike. The concentration process, which began in the 1920s in the 
electricity and gas sectors, changed this configuration and led to new relationships between operators 
and territories. The latter became merely a resource used for sector-based and vertical purposes: to 
conquer new markets and compete with other energy companies. By constructing bigger units (EDF) and 
importing cheaper gas from foreign countries (GDF), public monopolies began to “deterritorialize” their 
actions, unlike heating operators, who continued to be organized on a local basis. The former developed 
their own strategy, quite independently of the territories, which became mere spaces for production and 
consumption. This led to a juxtaposition of sector-based strategies which was barely coordinated by the 
State. In such a socio-economic configuration, the capacity of local authorities to implement a more 
territorially integrated energy regulation policy was very weak. It depended on the willingness of national 
operators – especially EDF and the nuclear lobby - to accept the development of new alternative local 
resources (geothermics, biomass, solar power, etc.) which could be used in heating networks. This was 
the main reason for the failure of the decentralization project at the beginning of the 1980s when the 
socialist coalition wanted to split EDF and GDF into regional units linked to local authorities, and to give 
the latter more input into energy planning (Poupeau, 1999). The move towards local regulation and the 
support for decentralized production that would diversify the sources of electricity production especially 
into renewable energy risked jeopardizing the creation of new nuclear plants. Thus, the French response 
to the oil crisis was to increase economic centralization by building more nuclear plants. This resulted in 
the fact that almost 80% of French electricity consumption (17% of total energy consumption, including 
transportation) now comes from nuclear plants. 
Although new and alternative ways of managing energy based on more decentralized units have 
appeared recently, the power of national, sector-based operators, especially the nuclear lobby, continues 
to structure the French energy sector and to keep the actions of local authorities in check. Thanks to low 
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production costs17, the nuclear power lobby rules electricity supply as well as the whole French energy 
market. Many decentralized projects for electricity production and for heating plants need to be 
subsidized because they would not be competitive without such support. This is the case for most wind, 
solar power, photovoltaic or biomass projects, as well as for cogeneration plants which generate 
electricity and heat. In France, the solution has been to force EDF, as the dominant operator, to purchase 
these “alternative” energies at high prices in order to meet the ambitious goals set by the government in 
terms of the reduction of CO2 emissions
18. These attractive prices are compensated by a fund, the CSPE 
(contribution to the public electricity service), paid by final consumers. This operation is apparently 
neutral from a financial and economic point of view, however it does not challenge centralization for two 
main reasons. First, EDF is for the moment, the only purchaser of the energy produced through this 
mechanism. Secondly, these decentralized plants have to comply with the national multi-annual 
investment program (PPI) introduced by the law of February 20th 2000 if they want to be subsidized. 
Many well-informed observers stress that this PPI is heavily influenced by the national operators, in 
particular EDF (Lenoir, 2007). In a way, environmental agenda-setting tends to strengthen the nuclear 
lobby as many French politicians and experts consider nuclear plants to be the best way of developing 
solutions to environmental problems such as the depletion of fossil fuels or climate change19. The 
hegemonic position of the nuclear industry explains why the increase in the number of decentralized 
production units has not led - as in other countries - to greater “energy autonomy” (Scheer, 2006; Droege, 
2009) which could give a more meaningful role to local authorities. 
 
3.2. The neo-liberal paradigm 
 
Many observers have stressed that the competition policy pursued by the European Union from the 
end of the 1980s went against the French tradition of public utilities. This idea gave rise to much debate in 
France in the 1990s about the renewal of State intervention in the sector or general energy policy 
theories (Poupeau, 2004). Far from reigniting these debates, we would just underline that as far as 
central-local relations are concerned, the liberalization process must be seen much more in terms of 
continuity, as competition policy leads to a quite centralizing pattern of governance. 
As a matter of fact, for the neo-liberal economists who shaped the new institutional framework of 
energy regulation in France, local authorities – more than central government - are considered a potential 
threat to efficient markets. The ideal setup is to guarantee a direct relationship between economic agents, 
i.e., operators (supply side) and consumers (demand side). Public intervention in the market should be 
avoided, except for defining broad missions of general interest (safeguarding supply, environmental 
measures, universal service, etc.) and for guaranteeing a fair market (creation of a national regulator, 
Commission de regulation de l’énergie [CRE] in France). This applies to the State but above all to local 
authorities whose intervention should be restricted to functions which do not interfere with the market. 
This aspect of neo-liberal thinking was very prominent in countries such as Germany, where local powers 
were much more powerful than in France (Fender, Poupeau, 2007). 
The credo of the “competition imperative” had a large influence on the way local authorities 
retrieved functions related to production and the granting of concessions. It has served as a general 
pattern, a paradigm, for the action of local authorities over the last few years even in the fight against 
climate change. The debates around this point during Grenelle de l’environnement were very meaningful. 
Although local authorities were recognized as major actors in the fight against climate change, the 
question of the territorial organization of energy policy was not on the agenda. Associations such as CLER 
                                                          
17
 Certain people stress that these are quite low because they do not take into account health or environmental 
externalities or because EDF does not make sufficient provision for dismantling costs. We do not wish to enter 
this debate (are costs fair?) and we merely observe that such social construction of costs has structural 
consequences for the whole French and European electricity market. 
18
 This is a possibility not an obligation and few operators (Enercoop is an example) prefer to sell renewable 
energy directly to consumers at higher prices. 
19
 We encountered this argument during the Grenelle de l’environnement to justify investments in new nuclear 
technologies. See also the recent speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, before the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (March 8
th
, 2010), praising the merits of nuclear energy in the fight 
against climate change. 
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were not invited to participate in working Group n°5 whose function was to propose a new “ecological 
democracy”. In Group n°1, dedicated to climate change, this question was not discussed as certain people 
argued that they were not there to deal with such a problem. Using agenda-setting and organization of 
the process as institutional resources, central government avoided tackling these issues. As a result, no 
real innovations concerning local authorities and public action came out of the Grenelle de 
l’environnement process. 
The importance of the neo-liberal paradigm in policy-making restricts local authorities’ capacities in 
terms of production and concession granting. In production, local authorities are given the possibility of 
investing in renewable energy in order to pursue ambitious French government objectives (laws of 2000 
and 2005). But the electricity they produce must be injected into the national network and purchased by 
EDF or other operators. They cannot use distribution networks to sell electricity to local customers 
through the company in charge of energy distribution or through new public or semi-public companies 
operating electricity, gas or heating networks along the German Stadwerke pattern20. As in the past, 
“decentralized production” - this official term is inadequate - continues to feed a centralized system 
offering no possibility for territorial differentiation. 
In distribution, local authorities were only partially able to recover their function of concession 
grantor. By distinguishing between two separate activities –i.e. infrastructure and supply-, European 
reforms have changed the very nature of the concession. Before liberalization, concessions included both 
of these activities, giving local authorities the possibility to influence price setting for example (Poupeau, 
1999). As a consequence of the liberalization process, infrastructure and supply became completely 
separate activities in order to avoid any discrimination in network access for new suppliers. The supply 
side is regulated by the State via the CRE. Prices are defined both by the market and the central 
government administration, and not by local authorities. Consequently, local authorities have very few 
possibilities to act in this market. In the infrastructure sector, while their capacity for action is greater, it is 
also quite limited by the State, EDF and GDF. The negotiation of new concession contracts in the 1990s 
only gave them restricted rights under local energy regulations. Their influence over the investments 
made by EDF and GDF is limited to annual negotiations and information provided subsequently. 
Concession arrangements for electricity and gas do not include an explicit right for local authorities to 
coordinate energy networks. The overriding rule is to allow customers freedom to choose their energy 
provider. As a consequence, heating networks remain the only real tool for local authorities –cities in this 
case– to develop an energy policy on their territory. 
 
3.3. The role of rural politicians 
 
It would be too simplistic to attribute the resistance of the centralized pattern of governance solely 
to State (administration, reformers) or economic (nuclear industrialists, national operators) forces. As 
researchers have showed in the French case, the action of local authorities themselves is another 
important factor in explaining the stability of French central-local government relations (Crozier, Thoenig, 
1975; Grémion, 1976). As in other countries, local authorities are not necessarily a monolithic category, 
opposed to central government. As we suggested in the first section, certain forces may favor a 
centralized pattern of governance they consider as appropriate to protecting their interests. This is the 
case of the FNCCR, whose action has been very important since the beginning of the 1990s. 
We showed in the first part of this contribution that the FNCCR has always had a close relationship 
with central government administrations and national operators (EDF and GDF). Its role in the 
centralization dynamic (which started in the 1930s) and in the nationalization process (from the 1940s up 
to the 1970s) gave it a privileged status and the opportunity to control subsidies allocated to rural 
electrification or to influence pricing reforms. This role continued when the traditional French pattern of 
public utilities began to be challenged by neo-liberal reformers in the early 1990s. EDF and GDF feared 
that they would be dismantled along the British model where reforms had broken up monopolies in order 
to introduce competition. One of the main issues in France was linked to the distribution sector and 
especially concession contracts which had not been renegotiated since the 1946 nationalization law. 
Consequently, neo-liberal reformers, cities or new operators could potentially use such an institutional 
                                                          
20
 However, local authorities may consume the energy they produce for their own use. 
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vacuum to introduce competition and thus to dismantle EDF and GDF. This threat pushed the two public 
monopolies into reconsidering their relations with local authorities. 
As part of this strategic process, EDF and GDF decided to rely on the support of the FNCCR. 
Negotiating new concession contracts could certainly contribute to preserving their position but it could 
also be a source of destabilization since local authorities - and cities in particular - could try to gain more 
powers through financial redistribution (taxes) or political and administrative control (planning, pricing, 
etc.). To avoid opening such a “Pandora’s box21”, EDF and GDF representatives proposed to negotiate a 
new national framework for concession arrangements and to choose a single partner, the FNCCR. They 
knew that this partner shared their fears that cities might win back power and challenge the role of rural 
politicians - the political grass roots of the FNCCR- in energy regulation. This alliance resulted in many 
measures that gave more power to local authorities while preserving a large measure of centralization in 
distribution (Poupeau, 1999). The cornerstone of this process was a decision to bypass cities by 
strengthening the syndicats départementaux d’énergie (SDE - energy bodies that include local authority 
representatives and set up at "département" level in the French politico-administrative system), the 
political base of the FNCCR. In a nutshell, EDF and FNCCR representatives used financial and political 
incentives to urge local authorities -including cities- to transfer their concession grantor function to these 
syndicats départementaux d’énergie where rural interests were over-represented. By doing so, the two 
national monopolies and the FNCCR managed to marginalize demands for special treatment coming from 
urban politicians. 
The consequences of this joint EDF/FNCCR strategy have been important in terms of territorial 
governance. This strategy not only preserved a kind of centralization, it also carved up the local 
institutional landscape and limited the capacity of cities to act. Except for those big cities which decided 
not to join an SDE, most French cities cannot use their concession grantor function for electricity, gas and 
heating networks to develop local energy policies. They have to convince the SDEs to participate in their 
actions and this is often quite difficult because the latter have their own priorities. Environmental and 
urban problems are not key issues for them and they prefer to focus on rural electrification or on 
controlling network investment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By introducing new stakes, paradigms and tools into energy policy, environmental agenda-setting has 
given new opportunities to local authorities. As consumers, initiators, urban planners, producers and 
distributors, they have been playing an increasing role in this field and now appear to be real partners for 
central government and operators in France. This revival has led to a new, much more complex pattern of 
governance than that which existed in the Post-War era, a period of reconstruction and modernization 
placed under State supervision. Have these developments led to a break in central-local relations and to a 
new pattern of territorial governance? In light of the questions we used to probe this hypothesis and the 
way functions such as urban planning, concession granting and production can be used by local 
authorities to influence public energy policies, our conclusion is clear: the current situation must be 
analyzed in terms of institutional continuity. 
Firstly, can we observe a significant change in the balance of power between central government and 
local authorities? Although this has been challenged by local authorities, the centralizing coalition has still 
managed to maintain a system of interactions which preserves the main characteristics of the previous 
situation. There has been no real decentralization. Powerful national operators such as EDF and GDF-Suez 
limit the room for maneuver of local authorities. The liberalization process gives a new legitimacy to the 
jacobin conception of public action by considering local authorities as a potential threat to fair markets. 
To understand this dialectic development - revival of local powers on the one hand, preservation of a 
centralized system on the other hand- and its consequences for central-local government relations, it is 
necessary to think of the ongoing changes less as a "zero-sum game" between State and local authorities, 
where the latter gains and the former looses, but rather as a process which transforms the very nature of 
energy centralization. The stakes have been changing since the period when central government and 
national operators had to reconstruct and modernize the whole country. As it is now concerned more 
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with regulation than direct intervention, the State has to develop new relationships with local authorities, 
based on mobilization and containment. Mobilization, because a regulatory State has to lean on many 
different actors – especially local authorities - to pursue national policies such as territorial planning or 
climate change. Consequently, it is necessary to give more autonomy to local authorities, especially to 
invest in major infrastructure projects such as production and distribution networks. And containment 
because the State has to preserve its legitimacy and its capacity to control fields it considers as strategic. 
This is the case not for infrastructure but for the supply market and the control of consumer behavior, 
spheres in which the action of local authorities is strictly limited. We consider that these changes involve 
new forces and new “lines of demarcation” which structure territorial governance as follows: 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE MARKET
SUPPLY MARKET
PRODUCTION TRANSPORT DISTRIBUTION
SUPPLIERS
CUSTOMERS
PHYSICAL FLOWS
FINANCIAL FLOWS
MOBILIZATION OF LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES
CONTAINMENT OF LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES
 
Fig. 2. The new pattern of territorial governance in French energy policy making 
 
Secondly, have recent changes substantially modified the relationships between local authorities 
themselves? Do they give more opportunities to cities to differentiate themselves from other local actors, 
especially in rural areas? We have shown how rural politicians, thanks to the FNCCR, have managed to use 
the liberalization threat to EDF and GDF-Suez22 as a tool for maintaining their position in the distribution 
sector. Thanks to this strategy, the SDEs have become a major actor in the local institutional arena. This 
revival indirectly weakens the influence of cities as those who transferred their concession grantor 
powers to the SDEs have lost a potential lever for impacting local energy regulation. As the syndicats 
départementaux d’énergie are frequently powerful organizations in terms of their financial and human 
resources, they help preserve a strong bargaining position for rural areas23. This gives them the ability to 
structure local energy agenda setting in line with their own preoccupations, based more on rural 
electrification than on urban or environmental issues. This should encourage us to be a little more 
circumspect with regard to changing patterns in central local relations within the context of French energy 
regulation. 
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 GDF became GDF-Suez following the merger with Suez in 2008. 
23
 For example, in 2008, the SyDEV (SDE for the Vendée département), which covers a population of 600,000, a 
large proportion of them living in rural areas, employed 84 officials and managed a budget of 100 million euros 
(150 million dollars). 
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